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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 18-3379 
______________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
TYWAN NAPPER, 
Appellant 
______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Nos. 2:18-00070-001, 2:17-00219-005) 
District Judge: Hon. Arthur J. Schwab 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
May 2, 2019 
______________ 
 
Before: RESTREPO, PORTER, and FISHER, Circuit Judges. 
  
(Filed:  May 14, 2019) 
 
______________ 
 
OPINION∗ 
______________ 
 
                                              
 ∗ This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
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PORTER, Circuit Judge. 
 
Tywan Napper appeals the District Court’s order denying his motion to withdraw 
his guilty plea without a hearing on that motion, arguing that his plea counsel misled him. 
Because the District Court did not abuse its discretion, we will affirm. 
I 
As a result of a federal wiretap investigation into a drug ring, agents executed a 
search warrant of Napper’s home, where they found heroin, fentanyl, cocaine, and cocaine 
base. Agents also recovered a list of Napper’s co-conspirators written down with dollar 
figures next to their names, over $6,000 in cash, and a firearm. Napper retained attorney 
Stanton Levenson and pleaded not guilty to distribution and possession with intent to 
distribute heroin, fentanyl, cocaine, and cocaine base, and related conspiracy charges. 
Napper also pleaded not guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon. His plea agreement 
contained a standard appeal waiver.  
At Napper’s change-of-plea hearing, he assured the District Court that, after 
reviewing the plea agreement with his attorney, he understood the consequences of his 
guilty plea. Napper informed the Court that he was satisfied with his attorney’s advice and 
representation, that Levenson did nothing he should not have, and that he did everything 
he said he would. The District Court noted that he could still raise ineffective-assistance-
of-counsel claims in the appropriate forum. The Court then accepted Napper’s guilty plea.  
Before sentencing, Levenson withdrew as counsel and the District Court appointed 
Michael DeMatt to represent Napper. Months later, Napper informed the District Court 
that he had asked Levenson to move to suppress evidence from an allegedly illegal search 
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of his home and that, although Levenson said he had filed it, he had not in fact done so. 
Based on this alleged misrepresentation, Napper moved to withdraw his guilty plea, which 
the District Court denied without a hearing. Napper timely appealed.  
II1 
We review the denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea for abuse of discretion. 
United States v. Martinez, 785 F.2d 111, 113 (3d Cir. 1986). We also review a denial of a 
hearing on that motion for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Thompson, 906 F.2d 
1292, 1298–99 (8th Cir. 1990); cf. United States v. Hines, 628 F.3d 101, 104 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(reviewing denial of evidentiary hearing on motion to suppress for abuse of discretion); 
United States v. Lilly, 536 F.3d 190, 195 (3d Cir. 2005) (reviewing denial of evidentiary 
hearing in ineffective-assistance-of-counsel habeas case for abuse of discretion). “An 
abuse of discretion occurs only where the district court’s decision is arbitrary, fanciful, or 
clearly unreasonable—in short, where no reasonable person would adopt the district court’s 
view.” United States v. Foster, 891 F.3d 93, 107 n.11 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting United States 
v. Green, 617 F.3d 233, 239 (3d Cir. 2010)).  
III 
Generally, “[a] defendant may withdraw a plea of guilty … after the court accepts 
the plea, but before it imposes sentences if … the defendant can show a fair and just reason 
                                              
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Although Napper waived his appellate rights, the plea agreement 
states that “[n]othing in the foregoing waiver of appellate rights shall preclude the 
defendant from raising a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in an appropriate forum, 
if otherwise permitted by law.” SA 26. 
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for requesting the withdrawal.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B). The defendant bears a 
“substantial burden” of showing a fair and just reason for withdrawing a plea. United States 
v. King, 604 F.3d 125, 139 (3d Cir. 2010). When deciding whether a defendant has made 
this showing, we consider whether: “(1) the defendant asserts his innocence; (2) the 
defendant proffered strong reasons justifying the withdrawal; and (3) the government 
would be prejudiced by the withdrawal.” United States v. Siddons, 660 F.3d 699, 703 (3d 
Cir. 2011); see also United States v. Jones, 336 F.3d 245, 252 (3d Cir. 2003). The District 
Court found that Napper failed all three of these factors.2 
Napper’s sole argument rests on the second Siddons–Jones factor—the strength of 
the defendant’s reasons for withdrawing the plea. A defendant may withdraw a guilty plea 
based on ineffective assistance of counsel only if (1) “the defendant shows that his 
attorney’s advice was under all the circumstances unreasonable under prevailing 
professional norms,” and (2) “the defendant shows that he suffered ‘sufficient prejudice’ 
from his counsel’s errors.” Jones, 336 F.3d at 253–54 (citation omitted).  
Napper fails both prongs. First, he has not met his “substantial burden” of showing 
that a competent attorney would have moved to suppress the home search. In fact, none of 
his nine co-defendants, represented by nine attorneys, moved to suppress, which suggests 
they thought such a motion futile. At his change-of-plea hearing, Napper represented to the 
District Court that he was satisfied with Levenson’s representation. The Court also asked 
                                              
2 Napper fails to satisfy the first Siddons–Jones factor—whether the defendant 
asserts his innocence. At his sentencing hearing, Napper confessed wrongdoing and took 
full responsibility for his actions. And he does not argue innocence on appeal. 
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if there was anything he had asked Levenson to do that he had not done, and Napper said 
“no, sir.” Although Napper now argues that his plea was not knowing and intelligent as he 
did not know at the time of the plea hearing that Levenson had not moved to suppress, he 
still fails to establish “sufficient prejudice” because he does not establish that his motion 
to suppress would have likely succeeded.3 
IV 
Finally, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying a hearing on 
Napper’s motion to withdraw his plea. See Thompson, 906 F.2d at 1299 (holding that a 
hearing is not required when the allegations made in support of the motion to withdraw 
“are inherently unreliable, are not supported by specific facts[,] or are not grounds for 
withdrawal even if true”). The District Court found that Napper’s claims were vague 
allegations lacking factual support, and Napper has not demonstrated otherwise on appeal.  
For these reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court denying Napper’s 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 
                                              
3 On the third Siddons–Jones factor, Napper fails to show that the government 
would not be prejudiced by the withdrawal. In Jones, we held that the government “need 
not show such prejudice when a defendant has failed to demonstrate that the other factors 
support a withdrawal of the plea.” 336 F.3d at 255. In other words, if the defendant fails 
to meet the first two factors, as he did here, we need not address this third factor. 
